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Abstract 
Mahr and Csibra (2017) propose that episodic memory evolved to support epistemic 
authority in social communication. We argue for a more parsimonious interpretation 
whereby episodic memory subserves a broader preparatory function for both social and 
non-social behavior. We conclude by highlighting that functional accounts of episodic 
memory may need to consider the complex interrelations between self and subjective 
time. 
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Since the publication of Tulving’s (1983) treatise on episodic memory, psychologists and 
cognitive neuroscientists have amassed an impressive amount of data elucidating the 
cognitive and neural mechanisms that give rise to and support first-person accounts of the 
experienced past (for reviews, see Dickerson & Eichenbaum, 2010; Szpunar & 
McDermott, 2008; Tulving, 2002a). Nonetheless, relatively little is known about why 
healthy human adults possess this capacity. Mahr and Csibra (2017) propose that the 
defining component of episodic memory—the capacity to mentally re-experience the self 
in subjective time or autonoetic consciousness—may have evolved to support the 
negotiation of epistemic authority in social communication. According to this account, 
episodic memory enables people to ascribe confidence in their reporting of the personal 
past when interacting with others.  
 
Although episodic memory undoubtedly serves to fine-tune the nature and quality of 
human interactions, we suggest that social communication represents but one instance 
wherein this capacity bestows an advantage for its owner. The crux of our argument is 
that many non-social circumstances also require an accurate and confident recounting of 
specific past experiences as a means for supporting adaptive behavior. As one example, 
consider the behavior of an individual who decides to walk home along the longer of two 
paths on the basis of a recent negative experience along the shorter path. In this case, the 
debate (deciding between the longer, safer route versus the more convenient, but riskier 
route) takes place within the individual’s mind, and mentally re-experiencing a pertinent 
past episode may help justify the most appropriate course of action. Because it is difficult 
to ascertain the circumstances of our evolutionary history under which recollections first 
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emerged to guide behavior, a comprehensive functional account of episodic memory 
should be able to explain why salient past experiences tend to guide behavior in both 
social and non-social domains. In formulating his theory of episodic memory, Tulving 
(1985) seemingly envisioned such an account, stating that “the adaptive value of episodic 
memory and autonoetic consciousness lies in the heightened subjective certainty with 
which organisms endowed with such memory and consciousness believe, and are willing 
to act upon, information retrieved from memory”… “lead[ing] to more decisive action in 
the present and more effective planning for the future” (pp. 9-10). 
 
Beyond providing a sense of added certainty in guiding behavior, episodic memory may 
also play a pivotal role in conceptualizing the self’s existence across time. Current events 
often cue spontaneous retrieval of past events, and these recursive remindings (Hintzman, 
2004) help bridge the recollected past with the anticipated future. Profoundly amnesic 
patients with episodic memory deficits that preclude recollection of much or all of the 
personal past and simulation of the personal future provide a window into the nature of 
this relation. Indeed, a striking deficit for patients with a dysfunctional episodic memory 
is that they are often “lost in time.” For example, about 40 years after a medial-temporal 
lobe resection to alleviate chronic seizures, patient H.M. mistakenly believed that he had 
memory problems for only about one year (Corkin, 2013). Similarly, following a 
motorcycle accident that resulted in diffuse brain damage, patient K.C. was unable to 
answer the simple question of “how old are you?”, even though he knew the date of his 
birth, because he did not know the current year in which he lived (Rosenbaum et al., 
2005). 
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Of course, the aforementioned observations of amnesic patients are selective and are not 
intended to imply that amnesic patients lack a self-concept or the ability to think about 
time. Indeed, semantic knowledge may be sufficient to support cognitions about the self 
(Klein & Gangi, 2010). Moreover, Mahr and Csibra highlight that K.C. showed delayed 
discounting (Kwan et al., 2012), suggesting that episodic memory is not necessary for 
some future-oriented aspects of cognition. Although people may be able imagine the 
future in a manner that does not involve episodic memory (Szpunar, Spreng & Schacter, 
2014), this should not eliminate the possibility that episodic memory is necessary for 
future thinking that requires extending the self in time. We believe that two pieces of 
evidence support our argument. First, given that nonhuman animals such as pigeons and 
rats can discount future outcomes (Vandervelt, Oliveira, & Green, 2016), it is unlikely 
that episodic memory is necessary for judgments of intertemporal choice. Second, 
whereas healthy human adults use event simulations to curb their tendency to discount 
future outcomes (Benoit, Gilbert, & Burgess, 2011; Peters & Büchel, 2010), amnesic 
patients do not (Palombo, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2015). For instance, even though Kwan et 
al. (2015) found that some amnesic patients could use personally relevant future 
scenarios to support far-sighted decisions, their amnesic patients experienced great 
difficulty generating relevant future scenarios and were aided by either personal 
calendars or relatives. Hence, in the absence of external support, an impaired episodic 
memory system is associated with an impoverished perspective of the self across time. 
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Finally, whereas we and the authors of the target article have focused primarily on the 
adaptive value of the autonoetic component of episodic memory, i.e., mentally re-
experiencing the self in subjective time, Tulving (2002b) further mused about the 
capacity to be aware of the subjective time in which the self exists. The distinction is 
subtle but may be important for understanding the evolution of episodic memory and of 
the human race as a whole. In theorizing about its functions, Tulving noted that the 
awareness of subjective time is integral to the ability for humans to establish a continued 
culture by which the world is altered to suit their needs, rather than adapting to the world. 
If humans did not possess the capacity to project their minds into the future, they would 
have no reason to alter their behavior, based on relevant past experiences or otherwise, to 
suit the future that is yet to exist (Tulving & Szpunar, 2011; see also Klein, 2013). 
 
 
  
EPISODIC MEMORY AND TIME 	 7 
References 
Benoit, R.G., Gilbert, S.J., & Burgess, P.W. (2011). A neural mechanism mediating the 
impact of episodic prospection on farsighted decisions. Journal of Neuroscience, 
31, 6771-6779. 
Corkin, S. (2013). Permanent present tense: The unforgettable life of the amnesic patient, 
H.M. New York: Basic Books. 
Dickerson, B.C., & Eichenbaum, H. (2010). The episodic memory system: 
Neurocircuitry and disorders. Neuropsychopharmacology, 35, 86-104. 
Hintzman, D.L. (2004). Judgment frequency versus recognition confidence: Repetition 
and recursive reminding. Memory & Cognition, 32, 336-350. 
Klein, S.B. (2013). The temporal orientation of memory: It’s time for a change in 
direction. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 2, 222-234. 
Klein, S.B., & Gangi, C.E. (2010). The multiplicity of the self: Neuropsychological 
evidence and its implications for the self as a construct in psychological research. 
Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 1191, 1-15. 
Kwan, D., Craver, C.F., Green, L., Myerson, J., Boyer, P., & Rosenbaum, R.S. (2012). 
Future decision-making without episodic mental time travel. Hippocampus, 22, 
1215-1219. 
Kwan, D., Craver, C.F., Green, L., Myerson, J., Gao, F., Black, S.E., & Rosenbaum, R.S. 
(2015). Cueing the personal future to reduce discounting in intertemporal choice: 
Is episodic prospection necessary? Hippocampus, 25, 432-443. 
Mahr, J., & Csibra, G. (2017). Why do we remember? The communicative function of 
episodic memory. Behavioral and Brain Science, 1-92. 
EPISODIC MEMORY AND TIME 	 8 
Palombo, D.J., Keane, M.M., Verfaellie, M. (2015). The medial temporal lobes are 
critical for reward-based decision making under conditions that promote episodic 
future thinking. Hippocampus, 25, 345-353. 
Peters, J., & Büchel, C. (2010). Episodic future thinking reduces reward delay 
discounting through an enhancement of prefrontal-mediotemporal interactions. 
Neuron, 66, 138-148. 
Rosenbaum, R.S., Kohler, S., Schacter, D.L., Moscovitch, M., Westmacott, R., Black, 
S.E., et al. (2005). The case of K.C.: Contributions of a memory-impaired person 
to memory theory. Neuropsychologia, 43, 989-1021. 
Szpunar, K.K., & McDermott, K.B. (2008). Episodic memory: An evolving concept. In 
H.L. Roediger (Ed.), Cognitive psychology of memory. Vol. 2 of Learning and 
memory: A comprehensive reference, 4 vols. (J.H. Byrne, Ed.) (pp. 491-509). 
Oxford: Elsevier. 
Szpunar, K.K., Spreng, R.N., & Schacter, D.L. (2014). A taxonomy of prospection: 
Introducing an organizational framework for future-oriented cognition. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
111, 18414-18421. 
Tulving, E. (1983). Element of episodic memory. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology, 26, 1-12. 
Tulving, E. (2002a). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 53, 1-25. 
EPISODIC MEMORY AND TIME 	 9 
Tulving, E. (2002b). Chronesthesia: Conscious awareness of subjective time. In D.T. 
Stuss & R.C. Knight (Eds.), Principles of frontal lobe function (pp. 311-325). 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Tulving, E., & Szpunar, K.K. (2012). Does the future exist? In B. Levine & F.I.M. Craik 
(Eds.), The mind and the frontal lobes: Cognition, behavior, and brain imaging 
(pp. 248-263). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Vanderveldt, A., Oliveira, L., & Green, L. (2016). Delay discounting: Pigeon, rat, 
human—does it matter? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning 
and Cognition, 42, 141–162. 
 	
